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In May last, in *The Classical Journal*, 6,330-342, Professor Kirtland contributed an article entitled *The Consequents of the Commission's Report*. He was able to announce that 56 Colleges and Universities had accepted the requirements set by the Commission, with certain slight modifications, indeed, in some cases, but in the main with cordial approval.

He said, however, that the new requirements had met with one serious check in the attitude of the New York State Education department. This Department published in 1910 a syllabus for secondary schools in which the Commission's definitions of the requirements were printed in full, but on the ground that the New York schools were not ready for them certain modifications of the requirements were made for the schools, in two directions. More work was prescribed and the work not prescribed was to be done at sight. Professor Kirtland thought that this was a misinterpretation of the Commission's requirements; for, in his opinion, the commission intended that an amount of Latin equivalent to what had been formerly read should still be read intensively as before, but that the definite prescriptions should be reduced. In Professor Kirtland's view sight translation when done should be over and above the stated amount of reading.

If this is the correct interpretation of the requirements of the Commission then it is evident that no particular relief would be experienced by the schools in following the Commission's report. But there is another point of greater importance. The action of the New York State Department affects all the public schools in the state. So far as I know it is the first action on the part of any public school system. The requirements of the various colleges apply primarily to those schools that prepare for the colleges and to the comparatively small number of students that enter from the High Schools. But the problem of Latin teaching is much more extensive than that. It affects the work of thousands upon thousands of the pupils in the High Schools who never go to college. In view of this the action of the New York State Department instead of being a check to the Commission's requirements is the very greatest step that has yet been taken. Under it all the pupils in the public schools in New York State have the opportunity to be trained in Latin in a rational and progressive manner. The old system of cramming four books of

Caesar in a year without regard to anything but the daily rate of progress can be abandoned. Intensive study can be restricted in amount with corresponding increase in efficiency and the training in sight translation of Latin to which all teaching ought to look can be made a serious part of the course.

I infer that the chief difficulty in Professor Kirtland's mind is this very one of sight translation. In that the teachers in our schools do need some guidance. Not infrequently the method used is the following. A teacher having a certain part of the class period free proceeds to read with the class some Latin that the pupils have not seen. He assists the pupils to a kind of rendering by giving them the meanings of the words that they do not know, by prompting them as to constructions which seem to be beyond their power, and in effect by doing the work for them. The pupils never see again what they have read and they have merely gone through an apparent exercise in sight translation for a few minutes. This picture is not overdrawn. It may be verified at almost any time. Now, sight translation of this kind is practically valueless. Furthermore, it is not really sight translation at all, and if the schools were going to introduce sight translation after this fashion there might be reason to lament the Commission's report. But such an interpretation cannot long exist. Pupils who read at sight in this way will not be able to pass a sight examination. Their reading power will not have been developed and inasmuch as failure in the sight translation involves total failure, according to the Commission's requirement, to continue such a method in sight translation would be disastrous to the teacher.

Sight translation in reality should be a method of preparation of a lesson, not an exercise in itself. Pupils should be led to think out the meanings of words from stems they already know, to gather the meaning of sentences, not merely by a knowledge of words but by inflections of noun and verb. Proper phrasing in reading should be important and many other matters which the class-room practice would bring up. But above all every passage thus read at sight should be reviewed at home. It might well be the subject of intensive study but in any case it should be re-translated in class. Only in this way can pupils be led to develop the habit of reading accurately at sight.

If this practice is followed, it would seem to make very little difference whether the New York State

Department has interpreted the Commission's requirements in the way that Professor Kirtland does or not. The main object, namely, a close study of certain particular writings and the ability to read at sight, the two objects which progressive policy now demands for Latin, would be attained. Furthermore, the additional requirements of the State Department do not involve any lack of uniformity and thus do not militate against the main purpose for which the Commission was constituted. In fact they are much less reactionary—if they may be called reactionary—than the modifications of Stanford University which allow Terence's *Phormio* in addition to the authors set by the Commission.

Professor Kirtland should remember that the conditions in the public schools of New York are not those prevailing in private schools or in other public schools in the United States. If by means of the compromise suggested by this syllabus we can in this state work toward the full realization of the Commission's desires much will be accomplished, but if the new requirements had been adopted completely in this great state and had then been followed by unsuccessful results the work of the Commission would be entirely undone.

G. L.

PROTASES—CATEGORY VERSUS FACT

Pigeon-holes for thought are useful; but when the pigeon-hole usurps ownership and ousts the thought, it is sometimes a sign that it is desirable to construct new pigeon-holes, and incidentally to employ a better style of architecture. Some of us are used to 'ideal' protases. Others, if they should make us a friendly call, would think themselves at home, except in name, among our 'possible' cases. Still others dwell in similar style among 'less vivid future' conditions.

One eminent grammarian would discard 'conditions' altogether, and revel in 'assumptions'. But in his pigeon-hole of 'ideal assumptions' our first thinker would rub his eyes in vain to discover his whereabouts; for these 'ideal assumptions' include those in which the 'ideal certainty' is often a certainty that the supposed case is 'unreal'!—shall we call it an unreal ideality? or an ideal unreality?

We dally with 'logical conditions'. Is it any less logical to say, If I hadn't come, I shouldn't be here, than to say, If I came, I am here? We read of 'conditions of fact' as an inclusive term for all indicative protases. Are we then to make no discrimination between the assumption of an actual fact as such, like this, *Si hoc post hominum memoriam contigit nemini*, and the supposition which we cannot know to be a fact, and which may indeed be untrue, like this, *Si frater tuus, tuus avunculus vivit*? Again, we stake our grammatical reputation upon the statement that conditions contrary to fact are always expressed by secondary tenses of the Subjunctive, only to hasten to admit in notes and exceptions that pri-

mary tenses also are used for this purpose. When you think of it, must not every protasis express either a fact or not a fact? something either real or unreal?

If one is to dare speak irreverently of these sacred shibboleths, this might seem the favorable moment, when the question of a more uniform terminology in matters grammatical is already above the horizon. If we cannot agree in a given language, how can it be expected that the 'ancienta' and the 'moderns' are going to get together in terminology?

The excuse lies in the subtle distinctions that must be made; but the excuse is hardly sufficient to justify the fact that the analysis and classification of protases by schoolmen is often vague, arbitrary, or incorrect. How much more difficult must it be then for the schoolboy to distinguish accurately such cases as the following?

If Roosevelt *is* elected to a third term, his friends will be elated.

If Roosevelt *is* our only living ex-President, it does not follow that he will ever live in the White House again.

If Roosevelt *is* eating his dinner, he is engaged in the processes of mastication and delutition.

If Roosevelt *is* on a hunting trip, he uses his rifle.

If Roosevelt *were* in the White House he *would* be in Washington.

If Roosevelt *were* to be elected to a third term, he *would be* in Washington.

If one must hesitate and think twice in classifying such sentences in his own language, how much more difficult is the problem in so complex a tongue as the Latin!

How is this matter being presented to the youth of America? Examples of faulty classification from recent text-books show the disastrous result of attempting to pigeon-hole under certain theoretically inclusive categories many diverse facts or phenomena:

(1) Here is a very neat little elementary Latin composition book, published in 1909. It divides conditions into three kinds, and describes the first of the three as "Conditions of Fact". Four examples are cited to illustrate this category:

(a) *hi, si quid erat durius, concurrebant*, if any extra hard fighting was going on, these men would run up.

(b) *si quid vult, ad me venire oportet*, if he wishes anything, he ought to come to me.

(c) *si obsides mihi dabuntur, pacem vobiscum faciam*, if hostages are given to me, I will make peace with you.

(d) *haec si enuntiata erunt, gravissimum supplicium de nobis sumet*, if this is announced, he will inflict upon us the severest punishment.

All this is entirely lucid and orthodox, with the exception of the fundamental proposition that these are conditions of fact. As a matter of fact, in only

the first example does the protasis necessarily represent a fact. Even there it is not a particular fact or individual occurrence that is represented, but any one of a series of events, the very existence of which series implies that each individual event did at some time take place. Sentence (b) may likewise represent a general condition, meaning, whenever he wishes anything, etc.; in which case the fact of wishing is indeed implied. But it may also mean to leave open the question whether there is any such desire at all, in which case the fact is clearly not assumed. Conditions (c) and (d) refer to the future, and the situations supposed may never be realized. In one case the writer may be fairly presumed to hope the condition will become true; in the other, he probably hopes the condition never will be realized. Only by a misconception or a misuse of language can these protases be classified as conditions of fact.

(2) A popular beginners' book, also published in 1909, recognizes three types of conditional sentences, of which the first type is called "Simple Conditions (Nothing implied as to the reality of the Supposed Case)", and the other two types include all Subjunctive conditions. What place will there be, then, for the first example cited by the first author, where the fact of the condition *was* implied? The first example given in the exercises on these conditions where nothing is "implied as to the reality of the supposed case" is this: *Mors non est timenda, si animus immortalis est*. How do we know that nothing is implied as to the reality of the supposed case in this sentence? Would it not make a great difference in what context it should occur? Suppose, for example, it occurs in certain parts of Cicero's first book of the *Tusculan Disputations*, or in some one of the Christian Church fathers? Would the implication not probably be in such connection that the soul is immortal, and that *if* that is true, as the writer assumes it to be true, the first part of the sentence quoted follows logically as a cheering truth?

Or, again, as in this same book the third type consists of "Conditions contrary to fact", in which only the imperfect and the pluperfect Subjunctive is recognized by the author as occurring, just when is the pupil expected to unlearn that, and find that the present Subjunctive also is used many times, in instances scattered from Plautus down to the Augustan age, for the same purpose?

(3) Another beginners' book, published in 1906, starts its classification with "real conditions", explaining that a real condition is "stated simply without implying anything as to its truth". Why such conditions are especially "real" is difficult to comprehend! Moreover the term "real" seems to be used by the author without any reference to that type of Indicative condition which is evidently real rather

than indeterminate; and not one of the illustrative examples implies the reality of the supposition. The same book states that "unreal" conditions are expressed by secondary tenses of the Subjunctive, and the learner has no intimation that there is any other way. This is true also of all the other similar books.

(4) A fourth book starts off with "simple" conditions, and the learner is asked to "observe" that nothing is implied as to the fulfillment of the condition. But what will this learner think when he chances to observe, on reaching the first Catiline oration, such a condition as this?—*Si hoc post hominum memoriam contigit nemini, vocis expectas contumeliam, cum sis gravissimo iudicio taciturnitatis oppressus?*

This same book, unlike either of the three preceding ones, recognizes two types of "future" conditions.

(5) Still another book declares that in a conditional sentence the Indicative is used "to state or assume a fact", while the Subjunctive expresses "what is doubtful or contrary to fact". How are we to reconcile this with the teaching of the previously considered book that nothing whatever as to fulfillment is implied in Indicative conditions? And again, if "nothing is implied", is not such a condition "doubtful"? What then will the beginner do? Use the Subjunctive? or the Indicative? Thus is the helpless learner involved in inextricable confusion and contradiction.

(6) Another well-known book 'side-steps' the difficulty altogether by declining to treat the subject of conditions at all during the period of the beginners' Latin book. When the pupil is expected to tackle this problem is left entirely in the dark by this author.

(7) Nor are the grammars blameless. Our most minute and complete American Latin grammar, while it follows a carefully worked-out plan of treatment, to be commended in many ways, starts us off wrong by undertaking to divide all protases into two classes, "indeterminate protases", and "protases of action non-occurrent", in the Imperfect and Pluperfect tenses of the Subjunctive—a conspectus in which we get no glimpse of conditions implying a fact, of general conditions, or of contrary-to-fact conditions in the Present Subjunctive.

And the eminent grammarian whose subtle analysis has probably discovered more new grammatical categories and invented more novel nomenclature to describe them than any of his contemporaries proposes in his recent textbook to classify all conditions as "either assumptions of fact (Indicative) or Ideal Assumptions (Subjunctive)". If he is correct, it is clear that there are irreconcilable variations between this classification and those of various predecessors.

Not only is it most desirable, therefore, as has

happily begun to be realized, that there should be uniformity between the terms used for the same phenomena by different grammarians dealing with protases, but it appears clear that in their desire to frame concise and easily remembered categories for protases, which should be inclusive and not too hard for the frail mental equipment of some beginners in Latin, writers on this delicate subject have sent out a large number of inaccurate statements calculated to mislead and bewilder a mind genuinely searching for grammatical truth. There are, of course, protases that imply the truth of the supposition, and those that imply nothing at all with reference to that question; there are Present Subjunctive conditions that imply the falsity of a supposition, and there are those that imply nothing about truth or falsity. Some of these classes are more frequently illustrated, some, less frequently. Certainly existing classifications as a rule emphasize too little certain types of protasis:

(a) Protases implying actual fulfillment.

Cicero is full of protases of this type: compare e. g. *Tusc. Disp.* 1.6, *Quare si aliquid oratoriae laudis nostra attulimus industria, multo studiosius philosophiae fontis aperiemus, e quibus etiam illa manabant.* Here there is not a particle of doubt on the part of writer or reader that Cicero assumes the truth of the supposition and uses the acknowledgement of its truth thus assumed as a basis for confident prophecy in which confidence he evidently expects his readers to share. Similarly in the anacoluthic sentence in 2.3 of the same work, in which the principal clauses are the following, *sed si reperiebantur non nulli, qui nihil laudarent, . . . quid futurum putamus . . . ?*, Cicero knows that his reader follows him in assuming, or rather recognizing, the truth of the supposition.

Nor is this something that the young Latin student can avoid. He will find in the first Catiline oration a considerable number of protases of this kind (one example has been already quoted in this paper). To be exact, there are not less than seven cases of this type in this oration, as many as there are of the protasis contrary to fact.

Professor Bennett, in his new volume, *Syntax of Early Latin*, has exhibited many interesting examples of this type of condition, calling attention to the force which such protases frequently have logically as "concessive", or, as he prefers to describe it, "adversative". That fact must not, however, delude anybody into neglecting them as genuine forms of protasis (in the first examples cited above we have seen that the force of the protases is more nearly causal, in the last analysis, as also in *Livy* 21.18.11).

(b) Protases implying non-fulfillment, expressed by primary tenses of the Subjunctive.

Whatever our theory as to the origin of this type,

it is idle to shut our eyes to its frequent occurrence in various authors, and to try to relegate it to footnotes and fine print. Conditions contrary to fact expressed by the Present Subjunctive are common enough not merely in early Latin, including Ennius and Plautus, but the phenomenon lasts down into the Augustan age; while occasional instances of the use of the other primary tense of the Subjunctive in the same sense are found. So, for example we read in Catullus 6.2 *ni sint inlepidae atque inelegantes, velles dicere, nec tacere posses.* In Lucretius we meet numerous instances of the same sort of thing: compare e. g. 1.356 *Quod nisi inania sint, qua possint corpora quaeque transire haud ulla fieri ratione videres.* Indeed Lucretius is enough of a Scotchman to use the Future Indicative for a condition contrary to fact in 1.615 *praeterea nisi erit minimum, parvissima quaeque corpora constabunt ex partibus infinitis, quippe ubi dimidia pars semper habet dimidiam partem nec res praefinit ulla.* Vergil uses the type in the address of Venus to Aeneas. 2.599 *ni mea cura resistat, iam flammae tulerint inimicus et hauserit ensis.*

(c) Protases implying a general truth, or customary fulfillment. That such clauses are often equivalent to temporal clauses corresponding to the English 'whenever' sentences does not alter their character as protases. Nor does the fact that many such protases are expressed by one of the recognized forms for expressing particular conditions nullify the desirability of giving them their due attention in making our categories so that the learner will not find himself outside the pale of his knowledge so quickly. Of a half dozen school Ciceros on the writer's shelves only one proved on examination to give any hint to the student that in the sentence in *Cat.* 1.31 *ut saepe homines aegri si aquam gelidam biberint, primo relevari videntur, etc.*, he is dealing with a general condition (this book, by the way, is edited from the University of Chicago). And even if we should here needlessly change the Subjunctive *biberint* to the Indicative *biberunt*, as some have done following Madvig, we still have a case worthy of the student's attention at that stage of his knowledge. When he reads in *Agricola* 13 *Britanni . . . munera impigre obeunt, si iniuria absint*, he ought to know surely on what ground he is treading. And when he begins to find the so-called Subjunctive of Indefinite Frequency, he ought to fix its real conditional nature in his mind with no uncertainty.

It is clear that while our great grammatical works devote page after page to the various divisions and sub-divisions of the phenomena of conditional sentences, a classification at the same time comprehensive and reasonably concise has not yet come into use among our teachers of elementary Latin, and Latin in the succeeding stages. Such a classification should be made on the basis of fact rather than tra-

dition or theory. As the facts are easily classified on the basis of the usage of the two moods, the two kinds of tenses (primary and secondary), and different kinds of implication as to the fulfillment of the protasis, it seems most reasonable to form our categories accordingly. The classification suggested by the writer at The American Philological Association some years ago on this basis has never been challenged, to his knowledge, and is therefore again suggested in essentially the same form as it appears in the Proceedings of the Association, 36.

I INDICATIVE PROTASES

(Particular and General Conditions)

(a) Suppositions implying actual fulfillment. Si hoc post hominum memoriam contigit nemini, vocis expectas contumeliam, cum sis gravissimo iudicio taciturnitatis oppressus? Cic. In Cat. 1. 16.

(b) Suppositions implying probable fulfillment. Si damnatus eris, atque adeo cum damnatus eris (nam dubitatio damnationis, illis recuperatoribus, quae potest esse?), virgis te ad necem caede necesse erit. Cic. In Verr. 2. 3. 70.

(c) Suppositions implying possible fulfillment. Si patriam prodere conabitur pater, silebitne filius? Cic. De Off. 3. 90.

(d) Suppositions implying nothing as to fulfillment. Si frater tuus, tuus avunculus vivit, vult esse vos salvos; si periit, superstites voluit. Pliny Ep. 6. 20. 10.

II SUBJUNCTIVE PROTASES

(1) PRIMARY TENSES. (a) Suppositions implying actual or probable fulfillment (in general conditions). Nam vita humana prope uti ferrum est: si exerceas, conteritur; si non exerceas, tamen robigo interficit. Cato, De Mor.

(b) Suppositions implying possible fulfillment (in future time). Si, inquis, deus te interroget, . . . quid respondeas? Cic. Ac. 2. 80.

(c) Suppositions implying non-fulfillment (comparatively rare in the classical period). Eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus: Nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis, quod nunc abest. Ennius, Tel.

(2) SECONDARY TENSES. (a) Suppositions implying customary fulfillment (past general conditions). Accusatores, si facultas incideret, poenis adfliciebantur. Tac. Ann. 6. 30.

(b) Suppositions implying non-fulfillment. Nam nisi Ilias illa exstisset, idem tumulus, qui corpus eius contexerat, nomen etiam obruisset. Cic. Pro Arch. 24.

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[I cannot forbear to refer here to Professor Morgan's discussion of Aeneid 1.59-60 *ni faciat, maria ac terras caelumque profundum quippe ferant rapidi secum verrantque per auras* (a passage to me absolutely identical in nature with Aeneid 2.599, cited above by Professor Harrington as involving contrary to fact condition), in his *Addresses and Essays*

39-40. Morgan translated by "If he should cease to restrain them, they would whirl forth". See my note on the passage, published some years before Professor Morgan's book appeared, and before he discussed the passage at a luncheon of The New York Latin Club. Many of the passages cited as instances of contrary to fact conditions in the primary tenses of the subjunctive disappear before careful analysis, such as Professor Morgan's. Many forget that possible English modes of expressing an idea that seems more or less akin to the general sense of a Latin text are not necessarily sound guides to translation or classification. Some scholars have seen *ne* clauses of result in Plautus. I do not believe there is such a clause in any Latin author. I am sorry to comment in this issue on Professor Harrington's paper, but his constant insistence on the use of the primary tenses of the subjunctive in a paper whose primary purpose is to set right the matter of conditional sentences seems to me too wide of the truth to be allowed to pass unchallenged.

One other point may here be made. Assuming, what is certain, that Professor Harrington and I will never be able to agree about the particular conditional sentences which called forth the foregoing words, we get an interesting reminder of the subjective character of classical, nay of all linguistic, study, and receive a hint, if hint is needed, of the enormous difficulty of reaching "uniform grammatical terminology for identical phenomena". Who is to determine ultimately what are identical phenomena? C. K.]

[I am rather more optimistic in looking for practical agreement between Professor Knapp and myself. I have no quarrel with him or with Professor Morgan with regard to Aen. 1.59-60, though I am not sure that the average Roman reader, any more than the average American reader, would have followed Professor Morgan's subtle analysis of the thought, and would not rather have been impressed with the supposition of a case—in the future, if you please—contrary to fact. Would Professor Bennett include this under his category (*Syntax of Early Latin* 1.273) where the examples "bear either interpretation" <i.e. potential or contrary to fact>? However this may be, Professor Morgan just under the passage cited (p. 39) himself acknowledges the usage which I am illustrating, "in Augustan poets, perhaps in Vergil". Will not Professor Knapp grant that 2.599 is probably such a case, noting the use of *iam* and the tense of *tulerit*—that, after all, it *does* differ somewhat from 1.59? Finally, if we cannot get together on this particular passage, Professor Knapp surely will agree with the mass of scholars of all lands that, however we may philosophize as to the origin of the construction, there are numerous instances where to the reader it presents clearly the conception of a condition contrary to fact. K. P. H.]

REVIEWS

The Greek Commonwealth: Politics and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens. By Alfred E. Zimmern. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press (1911). 454 pages. \$3.00.

The author, a "lecturer at the London School of Economics and Political Science", prepared a great part of this volume during a stay at Athens as Associate of the British School. The work would

naturally be classed as dealing with Greek life and so be set on a shelf with Blümner and Tucker, though it gives little space to dress and home usage and far more to the relation between the individual and the state, to physical environment, occupations and economics. The reader, however, who looks to it for an intensive study of the fifth century will be disappointed. Wishing to take for granted in his public no knowledge of either earlier or later conditions, the author ranges at large from the Minoan Age to Alexander. Discursiveness is in fact his most striking—perhaps we should add, most agreeable—trait. With an eye single to the picturesque, he gives impromptu utterance to whatever chances to come into his mind, however remote it may be from the subject under consideration. An instance is his statement on p. 43, n. 2, that "the Greek world is, in general, a jamless world". This habit affects not only individual statements but whole chapters. For example, in the chapter entitled Gentleness, or the Rule of Religion, in which the reader has a right to expect a treatment of religion in its bearing on gentleness, the author busies himself with the social-economic tendencies of the seventh century B. C. Only in closing does he bring in the Delphic oracle as an expounder of the law of gentleness, whereby Apollo becomes the savior of society. Long ago this high opinion of the oracle, championed by Curtius, was discarded. In these digressions his knowledge often proves inexact; he readily accepts tentative theories as facts; especially he has vitiated his treatment of Solon's legislation and of other early topics by a too close dependence on Glotz, whose authority he overestimates.

If, however, instead of taking the volume seriously, the reader will regard it as a pleasant diversion, he will find in it much to admire. The author brings to his work a vivacious style, local coloring from his residence in Greece, illustrative material ranging over nearly all ages and countries, and many fresh ideas from Wilamowitz-Möllendorff and from the French economists like Cavaignac, Francotte and Guiraud—suggestions which have not yet found their way extensively into the histories of Greece and hence may be unknown to those who have not read such authors. His chief service lies in popularizing this relatively new material. In order not to omit anything he has informed us that "there was more true equality in Turkey under Abdul Hamid than in the United States under Roosevelt". Many of his countrymen will doubtless enjoy this remark as an especially good slur on America.

Allowance should be made for the author's idealizing tendency. His picture of labor in the fifth century, when artists, free artisans and slaves all worked together on a social level and for pure love of their art, is too beautiful to be true. Again, if the Athenians of the age of Pericles were superhumanly good and great, why did their character

collapse so suddenly on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war? It is easier to believe that they had never quite attained perfection, and that their deterioration after the Periclean age has been greatly exaggerated by some authors. As too often happens in the case of popular works, this volume sacrifices balance and sobriety to attractiveness. With these various cautions, however, it may be recommended to the general reader as unusually suggestive and illuminating.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. GEORGE WILLIS BOTSFORD.

Metaphor and Comparison in the *Epistulae ad Lucilium* of L. Annaeus Seneca. By Charles Sidney Smith. Johns Hopkins University Dissertation. Baltimore (1910). Pp. 192.

This lengthy dissertation is an endeavor to show how extensively Seneca made use of metaphor and comparison, the spheres from which he derived these figures, and the way in which he handled them. The dissertation was submitted in May, 1906, but was not published until 1910. It is unfortunate that Dr. Smith could not have made use of D. Steyns's *Étude sur les métaphores et les comparaisons dans les œuvres en prose de Sénèque le Philosophe* (Gand, 1906), which would seem to cover the same ground as the treatise under discussion.

After a brief but excellent bibliography the writer devotes seven pages to introductory remarks. Some of these pages seem unnecessary as they consist merely of quotations from critics, which endeavor to indicate the important place in the history of Latin literature held by Seneca. The author then states (12) that the term "comparison" is used in the title of the dissertation, rather than "simile", in order to admit didactic comparisons.

Dr. Smith has collected a large number of examples—somewhat over 5000 metaphors and between 300 and 400 comparisons. The proper arrangement of this material is by no means an easy undertaking. Anyone who has attempted a task of a similar nature appreciates the difficulty in regard to a satisfactory classification of figures. The system adopted by Dr. Smith is, I believe, the best, and has been employed by a number of investigators, for example, Blümner in *Studien zur Geschichte der Metapher in Griechischen* (Leipzig, 1891), and the present reviewer in *The Metaphorical Terminology of Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism* (Chicago, 1905). According to this method the metaphorical expressions are classified according to the sphere from which they are derived.

The examples collected by Dr. Smith are grouped under the following main heads: I Man (17-149); II The Realm of Nature (150-172); III General Notions (173-180). The author's conclusions are given in 181-190. Subdivisions under I are: A. Soul, Mind, Emotions (17-27); B. The Body and

its Conditions (27-55); C. Shelter and Clothing (55-62); D. Family and Daily Life (62-81); E. Religion and Mythology (81-84); F. Farming, Hunting, Fishing, Horsemanship (84-90); G. Arts and Trades (90-102); H. Commerce and Travel (102-126); I. Warfare (127-135); J. Law and Politics (135-149). Under II, the Realm of Nature, we find: A. The Animal Kingdom (151-157); B. The Vegetable Kingdom (157-159); C. Minerals (159); D. The Elements, Weather, Seasons, etc. (159-167); E. Land and Sea (168-172). Finally under III, General Notions, we have: A. Properties of Material Objects (174-175); B. Words indicating General Actions (176-180).

Seneca's favorite sources for figurative expressions are found to be the relations of master and slave; the legal and financial spheres; warfare and conflict; travel by land and sea; and the human body and its affections and diseases. Dr. Smith would apparently explain Seneca's great fondness for figures from the last named source from the fact that Seneca was always more or less an invalid. It must be remembered, however, that such comparisons and figures are commonplaces not only in the Greek rhetoricians and philosophers, e.g. Isocrates, Gorgias, Dionysius and Plato, but also in the dramatists, as, for example, Aeschylus and Menander.

The range of Seneca's metaphors and comparisons is seen to be very large, although they are taken mostly from the language of daily life and from the commonplaces of philosophy and rhetoric. For Seneca, the student, had ready to hand in the writings of his predecessors a vast wealth of illustrative material. And so Dr. Smith concludes (181): "Seneca's claim to distinction as regards the use of metaphor and simile is not on the ground of originality in their invention, but is securely based upon his great skill in the application and variation of those already familiar, and the vividness and detail of some of the descriptions with which he accompanies them".

Although the terms are grouped under certain general heads which are given in an introductory table of contents, yet it is to be feared that the absence of a Latin index containing the more important terms at least will impair somewhat the ready usefulness of the work for purposes of reference.

In conclusion it may be said that the dissertation deserves commendation as a careful and painstaking piece of work and supports the belief of its author that the study of the figurative language of individual prose writers is of value in throwing light upon Latin style and phraseology (190).

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

LA RUE VAN HOOK.

Excavations at Ostia, the ancient port of Rome, are continued with much energy. The principal street of the town has now been laid bare for a length of nearly 500 yards. Its width is as much

as eight yards, and it is flanked with porticoes and paved throughout, so that the effect is quite imposing. Not far from the gate by which it left the town was found a splendid female winged figure, a combination of the types of Athena and of Victory, which we may suppose decorated the gate itself. An extensive cemetery situated outside the city walls has been partly explored. In the sand beneath the tombs cremation burials of the third century B. C. have been found. Many of the public buildings of the town have been completely cleared and the intervening spaces explored, so that the most important quarter of the city now forms a connected whole. The baths which had been excavated in 1888 have been further examined, and their beautiful mosaic pavements with marine scenes in black on a white ground have been brought to light. Under the palaestra adjoining these baths a large reservoir has been discovered. Moreover the barracks of the *vigiles* have been completely excavated, as well as the quarter behind the theatre, where remains of a Christian church were found, which was probably erected in honor of Quiriacus, the first bishop of Ostia (268-270 A. D.), but at least three centuries after his death. The foundation of the city of Ostia, which is now under exploration, is to be connected with the Ostian questorship in 266 B. C., since no trace of anything earlier has been discovered on the site.—From The Nation of January 25, 1912.

A book that ought to prove very helpful in school work—aye, even in college work—is Latin Word Formation, by Paul R. Jenks (D. C. Heath and Co. Pages iv + 81, 50 cents). After two pages of introductory matter, which seeks to define 'root', 'stem', and 'base', the author treats Nouns derived from Verbs (3-16), Nouns derived from Nouns (16-20), Nouns derived from Adjectives (20-23); Adjectives derived from Verbs (24-27), from Nouns (27-34); Verbs derived from Nouns or Adjectives (35-39), from other Verbs (40-43); Adverbs (44-45); Compounds (46-49); Prepositions in Composition (50-76); General Derivatives (77-81). A sample of the method will be helpful here. Under Nouns derived from Nouns the suffixes *tor*, *trix*; *or*; *iō*, *tiō*, *tus*; *ēs*, *tāra*, (*t*)*ium*; *men*, *mentum*, *bulum*, (*c*)*ulum*, *brum*, *crum*, *trum* are considered, and lists of examples embracing all words showing these suffixes which appear in the De Bello Gallico 1-5, In Catilinam 1-4, Pro Lege Manilia, Pro Archia, and Aeneid 1-6 are given. Similar lists are given everywhere throughout the book. Every teacher must be grateful for these lists, which give material for practice in the important field of word formation which has nowhere been accessible so readily or so completely before. The lists of examples in the 25 pages devoted to prepositions in particular appeal to me. There is just space left to commend another feature: Mr. Jenks has most wisely given no meanings in the lists. Here, then, is drill-material in abundance for everybody, of a most practical sort.

C. K.

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